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The U.S. Supreme Court has recently ruled on major cases regarding topics ranging from voting rights to tariff authority to abortion pills. As the end of the term approaches, the high court is set to deliver rulings on key issues touching all aspects of American life.
The following legal experts from the Michigan State University College of Law have been following many of these issues. As the court prepares to deliver key rulings — in the summer marking 250 years since the signing of the Declaration of Independence — MSU experts are available to comment and react to the following topics and cases:
Election law and voting rights
Criminal justice, religion and racial discrimination
LGBTQ rights and gender identity
Environmental regulation and accountability
Transportation, trade and tariffs
Quinn Yeargain is the 1855 Professor of the Law of Democracy and an associate professor of law at the College of Law. They are an expert in constitutional and criminal law, including the relationship between democracy and legal developments.
Contact: yeargain@law.msu.edu
Case: Watson v. Republican National Committee on the topic of voter ballot processing.
“In 14 states, mail ballots that are postmarked by Election Day and received shortly afterwards will count. In Watson v. Republican National Committee, the Republican Party is challenging the legality of these 'grace periods'. The RNC argues that, because federal law defines 'Election Day' as the first Tuesday in November, ballots must be received by that date to count in the election — and that Congress has preempted states’ powers to count ballots received after that point in federal elections.
The Court’s decision has the potential to significantly alter how elections are administered by states — and to disenfranchise a non-trivial number of people. While only a minority of states allow ballots postmarked by Election Day to ultimately count, and only a discrete minority of ballots in those states fall into this narrow category, the practical effect will likely be disenfranchising at least tens of thousands of people and potentially altering the results of elections. Moreover, given the Trump administration’s unlawful threat to crack down on mail voting, the combination of this ruling and heavy-handedness by the U.S. Postal Service in processing mail ballots could disenfranchise many more people.”
Case: Redistricting cases including but not limited to Louisiana v. Callais, Allen v. Milligan, etc.
The Supreme Court recently ruled in Louisiana v. Callais that the state’s 2024 congressional map was unconstitutional. As more states have launched redistricting efforts, such as Virginia and Alabama,Yeargain can comment on gerrymandering efforts. Read more.
Case: Rutherford v. United States on the extent of criminal justice reform and imprisonment time
Bradley Hall is the director of the Public Defender Clinic at the College of Law. He has an extensive background advocating for indigent criminal defendants.
Contact: bhall@law.msu.edu
“Rutherford v. United States involves the United States Sentencing Commission’s exercise of its authority to define the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that may justify a district court’s sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). In the First Step Act of 2018, Congress removed the Bureau of Prisons as the gatekeeper of sentence reduction motions under Section 3582, while also eliminating district courts’ ability to apply consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for many firearms offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Although the 2018 changes to Section 924(c) were to apply only prospectively, the Sentencing Commission adopted Section 1B1.13(b)(6) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which allows a district court, when considering a sentence reduction motion for an individual sentenced for multiple Section 924(c) offenses prior to 2018, to consider as an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ the fact that an individual sentenced today for the same conduct would not be sentenced as harshly. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Sentencing Commission acted within its lawful authority when it found that trial courts may consider a nonretroactive change in law as an ‘extraordinary and compelling reason’ to justify a sentence reduction.”
Case: Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections on religious rights when incarcerated
Frank Ravitch is a professor of law and the Walter H. Stowers Chair of Law and Religion, as well as the director of the Kyoto Japan Program at the MSU College of Law. He is an expert on the intersection of law and religion and how the Supreme Court views religious clauses in the First Amendment.
Contact: fravitch@law.msu.edu
“Landor v. Louisiana Department of Corrections is a case under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, or RLUIPA. Damon Landor is a Rastafarian who has taken the Nazarite vow, which means he does not shave his hair and has dreadlocks. He had not shaved his head for 20 years. He was incarcerated in a Louisiana state prison for five months on a minor drug charge. Shortly before he was released, prison officials bound him to a chair and shaved his head despite the fact that they were aware several courts had held that, under RLUIPA, prisoners have the right to have dreadlocks for religious reasons and that Landor was a sincerely devout Rastafarian.
“The case is not about whether the prison officials violated RLUIPA because it seems pretty clear they did, but rather whether the prison officials have qualified immunity against money damages under RLUIPA. This is a complex case. In 2020 SCOTUS held that money damages are available against federal officials under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act despite their claims of qualified immunity. This case is different though because the officials involved are state officials and because there are some potentially relevant differences between RLUIPA and RFRA.”
Case: Pitchford v. Cain on the process and rights in the jury selection process
Bradley Hall is the director of the Public Defender Clinic at the College of Law. He has an extensive background advocating for indigent criminal defendants.
Contact: bhall@law.msu.edu
“Pitchford v. Cain involves a challenge to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory strikes to remove four Black jurors from Mr. Pitchford’s jury in violation of Batson v. Kentucky. Batson requires a three-step inquiry. First, the defendant must make a prima facie showing of facial discrimination in the exercise of peremptory strikes. Second, the prosecution may give a race-neutral reason for the strikes. Third, the trial judge must give the defendant an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s reasons and determine whether the strikes were based on purposeful racial discrimination. In Pitchford, the trial judge skipped the third step and allowed the prosecutor’s strikes of four Black jurors without giving defense counsel an opportunity to rebut the prosecution’s reasons for the strikes. After the Mississippi courts rejected Mr. Pitchford’s Batson claim, a federal district court granted habeas corpus relief, and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Mississippi Supreme Court unreasonably applied Batson when it concluded that Mr. Pitchford had waived his right to rebut the prosecutor’s alleged reasons for striking four Black jurors.”
Case: Chiles v. Salazar on the topic of conversion therapy for a case that was remanded to the state of Colorado, as ruled by the U.S. Supreme Court in March.
Heather Johnson is an adjunct professor of law at the MSU College of Law where they are an expert on issues at the intersection of gender, sexuality, education and law.
Contact: john1981@msu.edu
“This case is about Colorado law that bans all conversion therapy. A social worker named Kaylee Childs brought an as applied challenge to Colorado’s conversion therapy ban. ‘As applied’ means that she is challenging the law as it applies to her specifically. This is different from a facial challenge, where a law is challenged on its face or as it applies to everyone.
“The Supreme Court did not strike down the Colorado law banning conversion therapy; they issued a very narrow ruling, looking at conversion therapy that is based just on speech, or talk therapy, as it is described by the challenger in this case. The Supreme Court sent the case back to the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals with the direction that the proper level of scrutiny to apply is ‘Strict Scrutiny.’ The analysis laid out in the remand of this case to the lower court by Justice Gorsuch noted that Colorado’s ban as applied the Chiles talk therapy must pass strict scrutiny, meaning there is a compelling government interest to limit a therapist’s speech in this case of conversion talk therapy. The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals could find that regulating medical care may allow a state to regulate some speech, as noted by Justice Jackson in her dissent. For now, Colorado’s law remains in place along with the conversion therapy bans in 23 states and Washington, D.C.”
Medical researchers and practitioners and members of the LGBTQ+ community point out the volume of research documenting the harm that has been perpetuated by conversion therapists. Regardless of how the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decides this case, it is likely that the issue of talk therapy and legal limitations on medical care will be appealed by the state of Colorado on the impact litigation teams representing Kaylee Chiles.
Johnson can also comment on a similar case in Michigan: Catholic Charities of Jackson, Lenawee, and Hillsdale Counties v. Whitmer, is being heard in the Eastern district Court of Michigan and will likely be appealed to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals based on similar arguments challenging the Michigan Law banning Conversion therapy.
Cases: Little v. Heacox and West Virginia v. B.P.J on the topic of transgender athletes
Heather Johnson is an adjunct professor of law at the MSU College of Law where they are an expert on issues at the intersection of gender, sexuality, education and law.
Contact: john1981@msu.edu
“Little v. Heacox and West Virginia v. B.P.J. are two separate cases involving state transgender sports bans. Challengers to these state laws that ban trans women from participating in girl’s and women’s sports claim that the bans violate Title IX and the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. Arguments for both cases were heard in January, and a decision could come anytime between now and the end of the current Supreme Court term in June 2026.
“In Little v. Heacox, Lindsay Hecox, a trans woman who is a student at Boise State University in Idaho is challenging an Idaho law passed in 2020 known as Fairness in Women’s Sports Act. This Idaho law was the first flat ban on the participation of trans women and girls on sports teams in public schools at all grade levels. Lindsay filed the case because she was unable to try out for the women’s track and cross-country teams at Boise State University in Idaho. During this litigation and through her college career she did not make the NCAA teams at BSU but does compete at the club level. Idaho’s governor, Bradley Little and Boise State University are defending the law.
“The federal district court in Idaho issued a preliminary injunction in August 2020 to ban the state from enforcing the law because it found that the case likely violated the 14th Amendment’s equal protection guarantee. In June of 2024, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit upheld the district court’s ruling citing two main reasons. First, the court commented on the categorical ban of trans women and girls as discrimination based on transgender status in violation of the 14th Amendment. Second, the 9th Circuit opinion noted that the law discriminates on the basis of sex because it only bans participants in girl’s and women’s sports teams but does not ban participants in male athletics. The 9th Circuit further noted that the law would require invasive sex verification procedures to implement that were also problematic.
“West Virginia v. B.P.J. involves a 15-year-old trans student who is challenging the West Virginia law known as the Save Women’s Sports Act, enacted in 2021. This West Virgina law prohibits trans women and girls from participating in women’s and girls’ sports teams in public secondary schools and colleges. B.P.J. is challenging this ban because she has publicly identified as female since the third grade, actively takes medicine to prevent the onset of male puberty and has begun to receive estrogen hormone therapy, and is unable to participate on the girl’s middle school sports teams. The state of West Virginia, the state board of education and county board of education and a handful of individuals are defending the law.
“The outcome of these cases will have many implications. First, the courts will likely decide the level of constitutional protection afforded to trans individuals for state laws that identify gender identity as a reason for differential treatment. If the court decides that rational basis applies, state trans sports bans, like medical treatment in [United States v.] Skrmetti, will need to be rationally related to a government interest to be held constitutional. Additionally, the court has the opportunity to clarify if “on the basis of sex” in terms of Title IX includes protections based on gender identity and sexual orientation. Title IX is the only federal law that protects LGBTQ+ students in schools from bias and discrimination. If the Supreme Court finds that Title IX — unlike Title VII (Bostock v. Clayton County) — is not inclusive of sexual orientation and gender identity, it will eliminate these protections for LGBTQ+ students in schools unless there were statewide statutes or school-level policies that protect students with these characteristics from discrimination and bias.”
Case: Monsanto Co. v. Durnell on the topic of environmental regulation concerning pesticides
Jeremy Orr is an adjunct professor of law at the College of Law. He is an expert on issues relating to environmental law and policy, as well as civil rights law.
Contact: orrjerem@msu.edu
“This case is about whether people harmed by toxic exposure still have a path to justice when the regulatory system has not done enough to protect them. At its core, it asks whether federal pesticide law can be used as a shield against accountability, even when people are alleging serious harm to their health from chemical exposure. If the court sides with those injured, it would affirm that state law still has an important role to play when federal protections fall short.
“This is not just a case about warning labels. It is about human health, corporate responsibility and whether people who believe they have been harmed by dangerous chemicals can have their claims heard. That matters especially for farmworkers, rural communities and others who often face disproportionate exposure to these risks. A ruling preserving these claims would recognize a simple but important principle: When people suffer harm and the system has not protected them, they should still have a fair chance to seek accountability.”
Case: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish concerning limits to pollution in communities.
Jeremy Orr is an adjunct professor of law at the College of Law. He is an expert on issues relating to environmental law and policy, as well as civil rights law.
Contact: orrjerem@msu.edu
“This case is about more than procedure. It is about whether communities living with the consequences of industrial pollution have a meaningful opportunity to pursue accountability. While the court concluded these claims can proceed in federal court under the federal officer removal statute, Justice Jackson’s concurrence is an important reminder that there should be limits to how far that theory is stretched. Her opinion reflects a real concern that an overly broad reading of federal officer removal could make it easier for corporate actors to move community-driven claims away from the forums where they were brought and into venues that may be less accessible or less responsive to local harms, particularly where powerful corporate defendants like Chevron have faced longstanding allegations of environmental violations and damage claims.
“That concern matters. For communities in coastal Louisiana dealing with land loss, ecosystem damage and decades of extractive impacts, including harms tied to repeat misconduct allegations in the Gulf, access to justice is not abstract. It includes having a fair chance to seek remedies under state law and not having those claims displaced too easily by expansive jurisdictional arguments. Justice Jackson’s concurrence recognizes that removal doctrines should not become another barrier to accountability. That is an important principle, particularly in environmental cases where the communities bearing the greatest harms already face steep obstacles to being heard.”
This case was recently ruled on and Orr can comment on the implications.
Case: Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC on the responsibility of claims for truck accidents
Matthew Leffler is an adjunct professor at the MSU College of Law where he is an expert on freight and truck law; he can also comment on the legality of tariffs and economic policy. Additionally, Leffler is known for hosting the podcast Armchair Attorney, which explores topics ranging from law to supply chain.
Contact: leffler4@msu.edu
“Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC involves a challenge under the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994, or FAAAA, to determine whether federal law preempts state common-law claims holding freight brokers liable for negligently selecting motor carriers or drivers. Shawn Montgomery, severely injured in a 2017 highway crash when a truck hired by broker C.H. Robinson struck his vehicle, sued the broker (along with the driver and carrier) under Illinois tort law for failing to exercise reasonable care in choosing an unsafe motor carrier. The broker and industry respondents contend that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(c) broadly preempts such claims because they “relate to” the prices, routes or services of brokers in interstate transportation. The case arose amid a wave of similar lawsuits following truck accidents and presents a clear circuit split: Some courts have allowed negligent-selection claims to proceed under the statute’s safety exception, while others, including the Seventh Circuit below, have held that the exception does not reach brokers who neither own nor operate motor vehicles.
“The task of the court is difficult. It must decide whether state tort claims for negligent broker selection are categorically preempted or instead fall within the FAAAA’s express carve-out ‘with respect to the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles.’ Montgomery and a coalition of states argue that these claims are classic exercises of a state’s traditional authority to promote highway safety by incentivizing brokers to vet carriers carefully, and that shielding brokers would leave injured victims without recourse while undermining public safety. The brokers, supported by the federal government, counter that the preemption provision was deliberately sweeping precisely to deregulate the trucking industry and prevent a patchwork of state liability rules; they insist brokers perform no “motor vehicle” operations, so the safety exception cannot be stretched to impose indirect regulation on their core brokerage services. The court’s answer will determine whether brokers remain largely insulated from state tort exposure or must now factor potential negligent-hiring liability into every load they tender.”
Case: Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump on tariff imposing authority.
Leffler can also comment on the earlier ruling by the court on the case of Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump on tariff levying emergency authority. Read more.
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